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IN MAKING public some of my misgivings concerning our method
of handling problems in the conflict of laws, I have heretofore been
prudent enough to confine the discussion, in the main, to specific cases.
The conclusions reached do, however, have broader implications, and
on this occasion I propose to explore these to some extent although the
more circumspect course would be to abstain from generalization until
there has been adequate analysis of many more specific cases. My prin-
cipal reason for venturing on this hazardous enterprise is that it pro-
vides a convenient way of pointing out problems which require further
analysis.
Why does a court ever refer to foreign law? It may do so for
various reasons, some of which have nothing whatever to do with conflict
of laws.
Three residents of Chicago, on learning that their ancestor in a
distant state has died, agree to dispose of the property in the estate and
divide the proceeds on the assumption that they inherit equal shares.
When one of them later sues the others for restitution in an Illinois
court, on the ground that he was, in fact, entitled to a half rather than a
third of the estate, there is no question of conflict of laws. The Illinois
law of restitution applies. It is necessary, however, for the Illinois
court to refer to foreign law in order to determine that a mistake was
made.1
* A paper prepared for presentation before the Round Table on Conflict of Laws,
Association of American Law Schools, Chicago, Illinois, Dec. 29, 1958.
t Professor of Law, The University of Chicago.
'Cf. Haven v. Foster, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 112 (1829).
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At the other extreme, a married woman residing in Massachusetts
contracts with a merchant in Maine to guarantee a line of credit to her
husband, the law of one of the states disabling married women to make
such contracts, the other having emancipated them.2 This may present
the central problem of conflict of laws (to call it, as I am tempted to do,
the "primordial' problem might be historically unsound).a The policies
of the two states are different, and their interests may be in conflict.
The court in which the action is tried will refer to foreign law, if at all,
for the purpose of finding the rule of decision.
Between these extremes there are cases which are certainly conflict-
of-laws cases, in the sense that they are treated in all the books on the
subject; but in them, when the court refers to foreign law it is for
a purpose other than that of finding the rule of decision. A proceeding
is brought in New York for workmen's compensation against a New
York employer on account of the death of a New York employee. A
question is raised as to the plaintiff's status as widow. Although the
couple had lived together as man and wife in New York for years, it
developg that they were married in Italy, where they lived at the
time. The.court may refer to Italian law; but if so, it will be for a
purpose other than that of finding the rule of decision. That is
furnished by the New York workmen's compensation law. There can
be no question in such a case of conflict with the interests of another
state relating to legal consequences of industrial injuries.4
The distinction is difficult to formulate and difficult to apply, but
{t is substantial and important.5  Conflict of laws, as we practice it, is
concerned with references to foreign law for quite different purposes.
Our failure to distinguish between them is to a considerable degree re-
sponsible for our troubles. The distinction, needs to be clarified and
better stated, so that it can be more easily applied; and we need to know
more about the clasps of cases in which foreign law is referred to for
some purpose other than that of finding the rule of decision. For
the present, however, I divide all conflicts cases into (i) those in which
'Cf. Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 374 (1878).
Cf. Sack, Conflicts of Laws in the History of English Law, in 3 LAW: A CENTURY
OF PROGRESS 342 (1937), partially reprinted in ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW
SCHOOLS, SELECTED READINGS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS I (1956).
'Cf. Matter of Masocco v. Schaaf, 234 App. Div. 181, 254 N.Y.S. 439 ( 3 d Dep't.
1931).
5 See Currie, On the Displacement of the Law of the Forum, 58 CoLu.s. L. REV.
964, 1019 (958).
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the purpose of the reference to foreign law is to find the rule of de-
cision, and (2) those in which the reference has some other purpose.
The following discussion is strictly confined to the first class.
The central problem of conflict of laws may be defined, then, as that
of determining the appropriate rule of decision when the interests of
two or more states are in conflict-in other words, of determining which
interest shall yield. The problem would not exist if this were one
world, with an all-powerful central government. It would not exist
(though other problems of "conflict of laws" would) if the independent
sovereignties in the real world had identical laws. So long, however,
as we have a diversity of laws, we shall have conflicts of interest among
states. Hence, unless something is done, the administration of private
law where more than one state is concerned will be affected with dis-
uniformity and uncertainty. To avoid this result by all reasonable
means is certainly a laudable objective; but how? Not by establishing
a single government; even if such a thing were remotely thinkable as
a practical possibility, we attribute positive values to the principle of
self-determination for localities and groups. The attainment of uni-
formity of laws among diverse states is, to put it mildly, a long-range
undertaking. Federations could be established wherein the central
government, while not disturbing the autonomy of the states in their
internal policies, would determine which of several interests must yield
in case of conflict. Treaties might be useful in the accomplishment
of the same purpose, but this approach to solution has certain inherent
difficulties." For various reasons, the political measures which would
seem to be the only possible means of avoiding or adequately solving
such problems have not done the job.
We do not, however, des'pair. We turn, instead, to the resources
of jurisprudence, placing our faith primarily in the judges rather than
the lawmakers. The judicial function is not narrowly confined; we
indulge the hope that it may even be equal to the ambitious task of
bringing uniformity and certainty into a world whose conflicts political
action has failed to resolve. At first, of course, the judges will not be so
bold (ot so frank) as'to avow that they are assuming the high political
function of passing upon the relative merits of the'conflicting policies,
or interests, of sovereign states. They will address themselves to meta-
physical questions concerning the nature of law and its abstract opera-
" See Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A Studi
, 
in Conflict-of-Laws Method; 25"
U. CHI. L. REV. 227, z63-64. (f958).
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tion in space-matters remote from mundane policies and conflicts of
interest-and will evolve a set of rules for determining which state's
law must, in the nature of things, control. If all states can be persuaded
to adhere to these rules, the seemingly impossible will have been accom-
plished: there will be uniformity and certainty in the administration
of private law from state to state. The fact that this goal will be
achieved at the price of sacrificing state interests is not emphasized;
rather, it is obscured by the metaphysical apparatus of the method.
The rules so evolved have not worked and cannot be made to work.
In our times, we have suffered particularly from the jurisprudential
theory which has been compounded in order to explain and justify the
assumption by the courts of so extraordinary a function. The territo-
rialist conception has been directly responsible for indefensible results7
and, what is perhaps worse, has therefore driven some of our ablest
scholars to consume their energies in purely defensive action against
it.' But the root of the trouble goes deeper. In attempting to use
the rules we encounter difficulties which do not stem from the fact
that the particular rules are bad, nor from the fact that a particular
theoretical explanation is unsound, but rather from the fact that we
have such rules at all.
First, such rules create problems which did not exist before. Few
will deny that the case of the married woman stated above poses a
problem in the "conflict of laws" as we generally understand the scope
of that subject; yet, the facts stated are insufficient to enable us to de-
termine whether there is a conflict of interests between the states. If it
is Massachusetts that has emancipated married women, there is no con-
flict, and no problemf
Second, the false problems created by the rules may be solved in
a quite irrational way-e.g., by defeating the interest of one state with-
out advancing the interest of another.10 In at least some instances, this
result could be avoided by contriving a different rule; but the substitute
rule may be objectionable on other grounds. Thus, the irrational solu-
7 See, e.g., Cuba R.R. v. Crosby, 222 U.S. 473 (i9 i 2); Walton v. Arabian Amer.
Oil Co., 233 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.), ctrt. denied, 352 U.S. 872 (x956); Currie, On the
Displacement of the Law of the Forum, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 964 (.958).
"See COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICr OF LAWS (1942).
'See Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, 25
U. CH. L. REV. 227, 251 (958).
10 See Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method,
2s U. CHm. L. REv. 227 (1958); Survival of Actions: Adjudication versus Automation
in the Conflct of Laws, io STAN. L. REv. 205 (1958).
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tions given in the case of the married woman by the rule referring to
the law of the place of contracting could be avoided by substituting a
reference to the law of her domicile; but that rule would be com-
merdally inconvenient and would consistently prefer the "obsolete" to
the "progressive" policy.
Third, despite the camouflage of discourse, the rules do operate
to nullify state interests. The fact that this is often done capriciously,
without reference to the merits of the respective policies and even with-
out recognition of their existence, is only incidental." Trouble enough
comes from the mere fact that interests are defeated. The courts simply
will not remain always oblivious to the true operation of a system which,
though speaking the language of metaphysics, strikes down the legiti-
mate application of the policy of a state, especially when that state is
the forum. Consequently, the system becomes complicated. It is loaded
with escape devices: the concept of "'local public policy" as a basis for
not applying the "applicable" law;' 2 the concept of "fraud on the law";'8
the device of novel or disingenuous characterization;' 4 the device of
manipulating the connecting factor515 and, not least, the provision of
sets of rules which are interchangeable at will.'( The tensions which are
induced by imposing such -a system on a setting of conflict introduce a
very serious element of uncertainty and unpredictability, even if there
is fairly general agreement on the rules themselves. A sensitive and
ingenious court can detect an absurd result and avoid it; I am inclined
to think that this has been done more often than not and that therein lies
a major reason why the system has managed to survive. At the same
time, we constantly run the risk that the court may lack sensitivity and
ingenuity; we are handicapped in even presenting the issue in its true
light; and instances of mechanical application of the rules to produce
indefensible results are by no means rare.'1 Whichever of these phe-
"This fault could be corrected, at least to a substantial degree, by the employment
of "connecting factors" having significance for the interests involved, instead of sig-
nificance only in terms of metaphysial theory.
"2See Union Trust Co. v. Grosman, 245 U.S. 412 (x918).
28 CHEATHAM, GOODICH, GRiswoLDm, AND REESE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CON-
rLier oF LAws 519 (4 th ed. 1957).
"See Levy v. Daniels' U-Drive Auto Renting Co., ioS Conn. 333, 143 Ad. 163
(1928); Grant v. McAulife, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953)-
"' Compare Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Liebing, 259 U.S. 209 (1922), wuith New York
Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357 (1918).
a See Jones v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 158 Misc. 466, 286 N.Y.S. 4 (Sup. Ct.,
App.T. 1936).
" See Currie, Married Women's Contracts: 4 Siudy in Conflict-of-Laws Method, 25
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nomena is the more common, it is a poor defense of the system to say
that the unacceptable results which it will inevitably produce can be
averted by disingenuousness if the courts are sufficiently alert.
Fourth, where several states have different policies, and also legiti-
mate interests in the application of their policies, a court is in no posi-
tion to "weigh" the competing interests, or evaluate their relative
merits, and choose between them accordingly. This is especially evi-
dent when we consider two coordinate states, with such decisions being
made by the courts of one or the other. A court need never hold the
interest of the foreign state inferior; it can simply apply its own law as
such. But when the court, in a true conflict situation, holds the foreign
law applicable, it is assuming a great deal: it is holding the policy, or
interest, of its own state inferior and preferring the policy or interest of
the foreign state. Nor are we much better off if we vest this extraor-
dinary power in a superior judicial establishment, such as our federal
courts in the exercise of their diversity jurisdiction, or the Supreme
Court in the exercise of its power to review state court decisions. True,
such a superimposed tribunal escapes the embarrassment of having to
nullify the interests of its own sovereign; but the difficulty remains that
the task is not one to be performed by a court. I know that courts
make law, and that in the process they "weigh conflicting interests" and
draw upon all sorts of "'norms" to inform and justify their action. I
do not know where to draw the line between the judicial legislation
which is "molecular," or permissible, and that which is "molar," or
impermissible.18  But assessment of the respective values of the com-
peting legitimate interests of two sovereign states, in order to determine
which is to prevail, is a political function of a very high order. This is
a function which should not be committed to courts in a democracy. It
is a function which the courts cannot perform effectively, for they lack
the necessary resources. Not even a very ponderous Brandeis brief
could marshall the relevant considerations in choosing, for example,
between the interest of the state of employment and that of the state of
injury in matters concerning workmen's compensation. 9 This is a job
U. CHr. L. REv. 227, 245-46 (x958) ; Surv~val of Actions: Adjudication versus Autto-
mation in the Conflict of Laws, so STAN. L. REv. 205, 252 (1958).
"5 See the dissenting opinion of Holmes, J., in Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S.
20"; 221 (1917).
.. Cf." Alaska Packers Ass'n v: Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (x93).
Even if such information were made available, the court could not candidly invoke it as
the basis for its decision.
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for a legislative committee, and determining the policy to be formulated
on the basis of the information assembled is a job for a competent legis-
lative body. We, of course, have such a competent legislative body in
Congress; but it has not seen fit to exercise its powers under the full-
faith-and-credit clause 2° in such a way as to contribute to the resolution
of true conflicts of interest.
The Supreme Court, in deciding those choice-of-law questions which
have come to it as questions of due process and full faith and credit, has,
in the main, realized that "weighing" competing state policies is not a
judicial function.2' It has, therefore, interfered with a state's choice
of law primarily when there is no real conflict of interests."2 In cases
of real conflict, it has usually allowed each state to apply its own law, and
thus advance its own interest. To the extent that the Court has done
otherwise, and has forced the interest of one state to yield to that of
another, it has simply legislated. I do not rail against this, nor do I
intend to crusade against the usurpation. No doubt the Court has been
sorely tempted, seeing problems which it believes should be solved in
a particular way, and frustrated by the failure of Congress to use its
power to solve the problems. I simply want the record kept straight. I
want it understood that such action by the Supreme Court must find its
justification in politics, not in jurisprudence, and that its decisions in this
field are to be evaluated accordingly. I do not want to be charged
with responsibility for understanding or even inquiring why, as a matter
of law, a fraternal benefit society is an "indivisible unity,"2 whereas a
building and loan society 4 or a mutual insurance company25 is not.
We would be better off without choice-of-law rules. We would be
better off if Congress were to give some attention to problems of private
law, and were to -legislate concerning the choice between conflicting
state interests in some of the specific areas in which the need for solu-
tions is serious. In the meantime, we would be better off if we would
admit the teachings of sociological jurisprudence into the conceptualistic
29 U.S. CONST.:art. IV; § x. See Cook, op. cit. supra note 8, c. IV.
'See, e.g., Watson v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954). This
m~atter is considered in a paper entitled "The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Gov-
ernmental Intereits and the Judicial Furction," to be published in a forthcoming issue
o'f the University of Chicago Law Review.
'*As in Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U:S. 397 (193) -
2 Cf. Supreme Council of the Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237 U.S. 531 (1915).
"O f. National Mutual Bldg. and Loan Soc. v. Brahan, 193 U.S. 635 (1904).
2C Cf. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Cravens, 178 U.S. 389 (zgoo).
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precincts of conflict of laws. This would imply a basic method along
the following lines:
i. Normally, even in cases involving foreign elements, the court
should be expected, as a matter of course, to apply the rule of decision
found in the law of the forum.
2. When it is suggested that the law of a foreign state should
furnish the rule of decision, the court should, first of all, determine the
governmental policy expressed in the law of the forum. It should then
inquire whether the relation of the forum to the case is such as to pro-
vide a legitimate basis for the assertion of an interest in the application
of that policy. This process is essentially the familiar one of construc-
tion or interpretation. Just as we determine by that process how a
statute applies in time, and how it applies to marginal domestic situa-
tions, so we may determine how it should be applied to cases involving
foreign elements in order to effectuate the legislative purpose.
3- If necessary, the court should similarly determine the policy ex-
pressed by the foreign law, and whether the foreign state has an in-
terest in the application of its policy.
4. If the court finds that the forum state has no interest in the appli-
cation of its policy, but that the foreign state has, it should apply the
foreign law.
5. If the court finds that the forum state has an interest in the
application of its policy, it should apply the law of the forum, even
though the foreign state also has an interest in the application of its
contrary policy, and, a fortiori, it should apply the law of the forum if
the foreign state has no such interest.
A probable by-product of such a method is the elimination of certain
classical problems which are wholly artificial, being raised merely by the
form of choice-of-law rules. The problem of characterization is
ubiquitous in the law and can never be wholly avoided. Without choice-
of-law rules, however, there would be no occasion for the specialized
function of characterization as the mode of discriminating among the
available prefabricated solutions of a problem; juridical gymanstics of
the sort displayed in Levy v. Daniels' U-Drive Auto Renting Co.2"
would be beside the point. And, though I make this suggestion with
some trepidation, it seems dear that the problem of the renvoi would
have no place at all in the analysis that has been suggested. Foreign
law would be applied only when the court has determined that the
io8 Conn. 333, 143 Ad. 163 (1928).
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foreign state has a legitimate interest in the application of its law and
policy to the case at bar and that the forum has none. Hence, there
can be no question of applying anything other than the internal law
of the foreign state. The closest approximation to the renvoi problem
which will be encountered under the suggested method is the case in
which neither state has an interest in the application of its law and
policy; in that event, the forum would apply its own law simply on the
ground that that is the more convenient disposition.Y Is it possible that
this is, in fact, all that is involved in the typical renvoi situation? 28
It will be said that it is no great trick to dispose of the characteristic
problems of a system by destroying the system itself. But my basic point
is that the system itself is at fault. We have invented an apparatus for
the solution of problems of conflicting interests which obscures the real
problems, deals with them blindly and badly, and creates problems of its
own which, in their way, are as troublesome as the ones we originally set
out to solve. Professor Yntema has suggested that Walter Wheeler
Cook, instead of attempting to eliminate the weeds of dogma from the
garden of conflict of laws, might have been well advised to reduce the
whole garden to ashes, from which a phoenix might in time arise.'
If I may vary this classic metaphor, we would indeed do well to scrap
the system of choice-of-law rules for determining the rule of decision,
though without entertaining vain hopes that a new "system" will arise
to take its place. We shall have to go back to the original problems,
and to the hard task of dealing with them realistically by ordinary
judicial methods, such as construction and interpretation, and by neg-
lected political methods.
The suggested analysis does not imply the ruthless pursuit of self-
interest by the states.
. In the first place, the states of the Union are significantly restrained
in the pursuit of their respective interests by the privileges-and-im-
munities clause of article four' and by the equal-protection clause.8 '
Incidentally, employment of this method would give a new importance
" See Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudications versus Automation in the Conflict of
Laws, io STAN. L. REv. 205, 229 et s$q. ('95).
Cf. In rs Annesley, (1926] Ch. 692.
'yntema, The Historic Bases of Private International Law, 2 J. AM. COMP. L. 297
(1953), reprinted in ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW ScHOOLS, SELECTED READINGS
ON CoNpLicr OP LAWs 30 (1956).0
* U.S. CoNsT. ar. IV, § 2, ci. z.
31 IM., Amend. XIV, § z.
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to those clauses as they affect conflict-of-laws problems. Ironically, and
precisely because of their fault of operating mechanically and imper-
sonally, without regard to the real problem of conflicting interests,
choice-of-law rules have the virtue that they rarely discriminate in such
a way as to raise problems as to the constitutional restraints upon dis-
crimination. 32
In the second place, there is no need to exclude the possibility of
rational altruism: for example, when a state has determined upon the
policy of placing upon local industry all the social costs of the enter-
prise, it may well decide to adhere to this policy regardless of where
the harm occurs and who the victim is.83
In the third place, there is room for restraint and enlightenment in
the determination of what state policy is and where state interests lie.
An excellent example is furnished by Nebraska's experience with small-
loan contracts. After first taking a position consistent with a rather
rigid interpretation of its policy, denying effect to a foreign contract
providing for somewhat higher interest rates than were permitted by
local law, Nebraska reversed itself and conceded validity to such con-
tracts where the law of the foreign state was "similar in principle" to
the Nebraska small-loan act." The policy of Nebraska was not to
protect its residents against any exaction of interest in excess of a par-
ticular rate, but to protect them against exactions in excess of a reasonable
range of rates, based upon the common principle underlying such acts.
This sensible approach to the delineation of policy could find wide
application, especially to laws relating to formalities. It is, in fact, this
kind of thinking which supports such legislation as section seven of
the Model Execution of Wills Act.3" This is not so much a rule of
alternative reference to the law of the state of execution, or of domicile,
as it is a recognition that the policies of all the states are substantially
the same and may be fulfilled by compliance with any-not just a par-
ticular one-of the formal requirements. Similar analysis may be
2 Cf. Quong Ham Wah Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 184 Cal. 26, 192 Pac.
1021 (1920), writ of error dismissed, 255 U.S. 445 (i92i). This kind of analysis
also tends to bring to the fore problems, not heretofore stressed, in the restrospective
application of laws. Cf. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dunken, 266 U.S. 389 (1924)i see
Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, 25 U. CHt.
L. REV. 227, 230 n. 12, 257 n. 55 (1958).
"2 Cf. Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, 249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W.zd 365 0957).
" See Kinney Loan & Finance Co. v. Sumner, 159 Neb. 57, 65 N.W.2d 240 (1954).
359 A.U.L.A. 347 (1957).
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expected to yield satisfactory results in the handling of the problem of
consideration in the conflict of laws concerning contracts.'"
I have been told that I give insufficient recognition to governmental
policies other than those which are expressed in specific statutes and
rules: the policy of promoting a general legal order, that of fostering
amicable relations with other states, that of vindicating reasonable ex-
pectations, and so on.W If this is so, it is not, I hope, because of a
provincial lack of appreciation of the worth of those ideals, but because
of a felt necessity to emphasize the obstacles which the present system
interposes to any intelligent approach to the problem. Let us first dear
away the apparatus which creates false problems and obscures the nature
of the real ones. Only then can we- effectively set about ameliorating
the ills which arise from a diversity of laws by bringing to bear all the
resources of jurisprudence, politics, and humanism--each in its appropri-
ate way.
" See Pritchard v. Norton, 1o6 U.S. 124 (1882) Fuller, Consideration and
Form, 41 CoLnM. L. REV. 799 (1941).
"7 Cf. Hancock, Choice-of-Law Policies in Multiple-Contact Cases, 5 U. TORONTO
L.J. 133 (1943) Yntema, The Objectives of Private International Law, 35 CAN. B.
REV. 721 (1957) ; Cheatham and Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 COLUM. L.
REV. 959 (1952).
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